Abstract. This paper examines the access control requirements of distributed health care information networks. Since the electronic sharing of an individual's personal health information requires their informed consent, health care information networks need an access control framework that can capture and enforce individual access policies tailored to the specific circumstances of each consumer. Role Based Access Control (RBAC) is examined as a candidate access control framework. While it is well suited to the task in many regards, we identify a number of shortcomings, particularly in the range of access policy expression types that it can support. For efficiency and comprehensibility, access policies that grant access to a broad range of entities whilst explicitly denying it to subgroups of those entities need to be supported in health information networks. We argue that RBAC does not support policies of this type with sufficient flexibility and propose a novel adaptation of RBAC principles to address this shortcoming. We also describe a prototype distributed medical information system that embodies the improved RBAC model.
Introduction
A fundamental concept underpinning the delivery of health care services is the notion that personal information shared with a clinician in the context of treatment is confidential. This means that the clinician must have the consent of the consumer to share information about the consumer with a third party 3 . In practice, it is becoming far more challenging to ensure that all confidential health information disclosures have been consented to, particularly as health service providers adopt electronic systems based on internet technologies to facilitate This research was funded and supported by the Commonwealth of Australia -Department of Health and Ageing. 3 In practice there are a number of important exceptions to the requirement for express consent, e.g., consent can be implied by circumstances or deemed unnecessary by legislation. For more information on consent requirements in health care see [4, 5] .
information exchange. Electronic health information networks 4 and electronic health records improve the ability of service providers to exchange personal health information and coordinate service delivery between clinical teams that cross organisational and geographic boundaries. As a direct consequence, an individual's personal health information is potentially available to larger numbers of people, significantly increasing the risk that the information will be accessed for purposes for which the consumer has not given their consent. A key challenge that attends the adoption of electronic health information networks is therefore to ensure that the principle of consent is meaningfully respected and enforced in electronic contexts. To achieve this a health information network needs to be capable of recording and enforcing individual access policies where the consumer defines the policy details.
Privacy in Health Care
Unauthorised disclosure of health information can have serious consequences including refusal of prospective employment, difficulties in obtaining or continuing insurance contracts and loans, ostracisation from family and community groups and personal embarrassment [15] . Once information has been disclosed, the damage cannot be undone so, to earn consumer trust it is important that unauthorised disclosure is prevented, not merely detected after the fact through audit processes. Broad consumer support for electronic health records will be predicated on a justifiable and well founded trust that the system will protect their highly sensitive health information in accordance with the consent that they are entitled to give or withhold. This includes accommodating the needs of consumers with especially demanding privacy requirements, e.g. persons receiving treatment for sensitive conditions (HIV/AIDS, addiction, psychiatric illness etc.), health care professionals receiving treatment and celebrities. If health information networks are to be adopted and supported by consumers, their privacy concerns must be addressed.
Overview of the Paper
Section 2 examines access control requirements in distributed health care information systems, focusing on the types of access policy expression that need to be supported. Section 3 describes the basic concepts underlying Role Based Access Control (RBAC) and highlights why it is well suited for health care information systems. Section 4 reviews related work. In Section 5 a shortcoming of RBAC is presented that limits its ability to support the required types of access policy expression that are discussed in Section 2. A novel modification to RBAC is introduced in Section 6 that addresses the identified problems. Section 7 describes a prototype distributed medical information system based on the proposed access control framework.
Access Policy Requirements for Health Care
In consent-based information sharing, consumers themselves are able to define the policies that control third party access to their personal health information. This represents a significant departure from the traditional approach where organisations established the access policy. The change is necessary because health care organisations are internetworking their systems, increasing the potential for unauthorised access. Since there is a myriad of individual scenarios, circumstances and relationships, the access control framework must be flexible and highly expressive, to ensure that a consumer's access policy can be recorded and enforced in a manner that mirrors their understanding of who they want to have access and who they don't want to have access. This will typically involve granting qualified consent to groups or roles, e.g. access is allowed for General Practitioners except Dr X, who is the consumer's father in law. To achieve these goals efficiently, the access control framework needs to support policy expressions of the following form [4, 5] :
-a broadly expressed or general consent (possibly) qualified by one or more explicit denials e.g., all clinicians except Doctor X; and, -a broadly expressed or general denial (possibly) qualified by one or more explicit consents e.g., no clinician except Doctor X.
Expressions formulated as general denial with explicit consent are required when the consumer wants access to be tightly restricted e.g., for information relating to sensitive conditions. In such cases, it will be more efficient to explicitly name the individuals or groups to be granted access rather than listing those that should not.
Support for expressions of the alternate form, general consent qualified by explicit denial are particularly important for efficiency and comprehensibility. To minimise system management effort, individual access policies will commonly be based on defaults appropriate to the clinical context that reflect acceptable current practice. This default policy will be expressed as a broadly expressed consent that grants access to appropriate roles. Individual consumers may wish to modify this default consent with a qualification that removes access from particular groups or named individuals, in recognition of their specific circumstances.
Explicit denial is also necessary to ensure that a consumer's access policy is reliably enforced over time (where that policy involves denying access). Since explicit denial is more than just the absence of a positive access right it must be removed for it to be overridden. To illustrate the importance of this feature, consider a scenario where a consumer wishes to exclude a particular Doctor, (Dr X) from access to their records. The consumer has also given consent for Doctors at Acme Clinic to access their records. If Doctor X subsequently comes to work at Acme Clinic, explicit denial ensures that he will not be given access to the consumer's records despite the fact that he holds the role of Doctor at Acme Clinic, to which consent has been granted.
To construct complex policy expressions with a minimum number of statements, and support the qualification of default policies to meet individual needs, the nesting of different expression types is desirable. Within a hierarchy of clinical roles, nesting would allow access policy statements such as: allow all clinicians (general consent), except for nurses (explicit denial), except for nurses at Acme Clinic (explicit consent), except for the nurse Alice at Acme Clinic who is the consumer's mother in law (explicit denial). We believe that policy expressions of this form are a practical requirement for efficient and manageable consent-based health information sharing.
An Overview of Role Based Access Control
Role Based Access Control (RBAC) is a mechanism for access control that decouples users from privileges by the inter-positioning of roles [8, 9, 11] . Users are assigned to roles and roles are authorised to access objects with privileges. This decoupling lends a greater degree of scalability to systems in which access must be regulated. A role can reflect the responsibilities of a position or job description in the context of an organization e.g. Doctor or Nurse. When an individual is assigned the responsibility to perform a particular job, a security administrator puts them in the appropriate role. They can exercise the privileges associated with the role because they are recognised as holding the role.
Unlike traditional Access Control List (ACL) based approaches, RBAC does not allow users to be directly associated with privileges as all privileges are held by roles. This layer of indirection between users and privileges that is introduced by the concept of roles is a defining feature of RBAC. It is the primary distinction that motivates the common claim that RBAC is more manageable than ACL based approaches in large scale systems with many users.
The primary motivation for RBAC lies in reducing the complexity and effort required to manage authorisation data in large scale systems [8] . It has been designed for environments where Discretionary Access Control (DAC) is inappropriate because end users do not own the information they are allowed to access and therefore should not have the discretion to grant access to others. It is particularly well suited to environments where access rights are based on competency or recognition of a professional qualification. Since this describes key aspects of the health care environment, it is hardly surprising that role-based approaches have found considerable support in health care settings [1, 3, 6] .
Roles facilitate efficient assignment and removal of privileges and importantly, analysis of privilege authorisation to users. Role/privilege associations typically change less frequently than user/privilege associations because work flow processes, (which define the set of privileges required by a role) are relatively stable whereas user/task assignments are not -individual user's job responsibilities change as they move between departments, change jobs etc. [7] . RBAC severs the user/privilege association through the interpositioning of roles, resulting in reduced management overhead. User membership of roles can be easily granted or revoked, thereby conferring or removing a potentially rich set of privileges in one simple step.
In systems implementing RBAC, the consistency of privilege allocation, (who can access what) can be audited efficiently, thereby reducing undetected configuration errors, a key advantage in the highly distributed environments encountered in health care. This is a key difference to traditional ACL based approaches utilising groups. Groups bring together users but they do not bring together privileges as roles do. This makes the analysis of privilege assignments difficult in ACL based systems since every object must be examined to ascertain the privileges of a user or group. In RBAC systems, only the roles need to be reviewed as all privileges are held through their assignment to roles. This distinction has an important consequence in terms of the ease with which a consumer can change or revoke their consent for information disclosure. When all privileges are held through roles, this is a significantly easier operation as privileges are centralised.
RBAC systems adhere to the principle of general denial with explicit consent. Only users that are assigned to roles are permitted to access objects for which the roles have positive privileges. Through static constraints, users can be prevented from joining roles for which they are not qualified (prerequisite constraints) or combinations of roles that are inappropriate (static separation of duty) [11] . Where selective role activation is permitted, dynamic constraints allow users to belong to multiple roles but enforce that only a subset of those roles may be active at a time (dynamic separation of duty) [16] .
The use of inheritance allows roles to implicitly acquire the privileges and constraints of roles beneath them in the inheritance hierarchy. For the sake of consistency, it is usually not appropriate to impose constraints upon roles within the same path (from root to leaf) on a hierarchy (for example, a member of a role is automatically the member of its descendant, so a static constraint forbidding joint membership of both does not permit consistency). In Section 5 we argue that as a result of the inheritance of constraints, RBAC does not efficiently support access policy statements in the form of general consent qualified by explicit denial or the nesting of explicit denials and consents that successively qualify each other in a role hierarchy. Policy expressions of this form are a practical requirement for consent based health information sharing.
Related Work

RBAC in Health Care
RBAC has received considerable attention in the context of health care, particularly in the hospital environment, e.g. [3, 6, 14] . However, the practical implications of implementing access policies based on individual consumer consent are not directly addressed. Access policies are determined at an organisational or departmental level and the ability to support individual exceptions to default policies is not a supported feature.
The OASIS project [12] has examined the application of RBAC principles to distributed health care information networks. In [1] the authors recognise that the standard RBAC framework is not suitable when individual exceptions to default access policies need to be supported. Their approach to addressing this problem involves storing exceptions to the default policy with the affected records themselves. This is not entirely consistent with the role based approach which stipulates that all permissions are held by roles, (since the exceptions are effectively negative permissions). Our proposal differs in that it enables individually tailored policies that are based on defaults through the ability to explicitly grant and deny authorisation for a set of privileges, (a consumer-centric role) without resorting to storing overriding access policy with records, an approach which we believe violates the simplicity of the role based metaphor. Since all access policy remains centrally located in the role definition, update or revocation of consent (e.g. when an consumer's circumstances change) can be carried out more easily.
In [13] the authors describe an authorisation model developed for the distributed health care environment of the U.K. National Health Service. Access privileges can be both granted and denied through the use of positive or negative confidentiality permissions. The model describes four different confidentiality permission types that have a fixed hierarchical precedence. Higher order confidentiality permissions types can override lower order types. The model addresses similar issues to our proposal. However our model differs in that negation of the privilege set of a role can be effected for any other role(s) within a role hierarchy rather than being limited to using four fixed precedence confidentiality permissions types. We believe this produces a more general and flexible solution.
Negative Privileges and Explicit Denial of Authorisation
The RBAC model that NIST has proposed for standardisation does not support explicit denial except in a limited way through the use of constraints [10] .
Packet filtering firewalls implement positive and negative authorisation through allow and deny rules where the ordering of the rules is crucial. Since the order determines the effect of the rules, firewall rule sets can be notoriously difficult to to configure and comprehend [2] . In our modified RBAC proposal, the role hierarchy effectively determines the rule order so misconfiguration due to incorrect ordering is not possible.
Contribution
The main contribution of this work is to propose a modified RBAC model in which a set of privileges held by a role can be allowed or denied to other roles without using traditional RBAC constraints concepts such as static and dynamic separation of duty. While this necessitates a more complex authorisation algorithm, the model allows highly flexible policy expressions and supports policies that can be based on defaults for efficiency but can be qualified to implement individual exceptions, a key requirement for health care information systems.
Implementing Explicit Denial in RBAC
RBAC does not efficiently support policy expressions in the form of a broadly expressed consent qualified by explicit denials since it implements a model where anything that is not explicitly allowed is implicitly denied. The mechanism of constraints is used in standard RBAC to deny the exercising of the privileges of a role that would otherwise be allowed. However, constraints do not provide an elegant solution when nesting of the policy expression types is required. This is due to the fact that constraints are also inherited in a role-based hierarchy supporting inheritance. Since an inherited role is also an instance of its parent role, i.e. a nurse is a clinician, constraints applying to clinician must also apply to nurse for them to be consistently applied.
Consider the the example access policy from Section 2. A static constraint that denied the nurses role will not be effective in implementing the policy because the role of nurses at Acme Clinic inherits the role of nurse, so it also inherits the constraint. As a consequence, nurses at Acme Clinic would be denied. There is no way to turn the constraint off for roles higher up the hierarchy on the same path, whilst maintaining consistency.
The Proposed Model
In our proposed health care model and prototype implementation an individual's access policy and the personal information it relates to are recorded and enforced through a consumer-centric role that we will refer to as a care team role 5 . Figure  1 illustrates the important components of a care team role. Authorisation (who can activate the role and exercise its privileges) for a care team role is determined by the contents of the role's allowed and denied lists. These two lists contain roles drawn from the affiliation and competency role hierarchies (discussed in Section 6.1). Specifically denied roles override equal or more general roles (i.e., equivalent or lower in a hierarchy) in the allowed list. This permits nested expressions as in the example given in Section 2. Figure 1 shows the allowed and denied roles that implement the example policy.
The support for nested expressions allows complex consents to be expressed in an intuitive and efficient way, without sacrificing the granularity of that expression. Denying access to an exception, (e.g. all clinicians except nurses) is 5 The description care team role is used since the role defines the entities that will have access to the individual's records. Entities requiring access are generally involved in the consumer's care and are therefore part of a care team for the consumer. Care team roles are always associated with a single consumer. A consumer will have multiple care team roles if subsets of their health information require different access policies. A care team role controls access to the records whose identifiers are listed in the permission set of the role.
more efficient than explicitly naming all the clinical roles that are not nurses. It also mirrors the way that people think about access policies, i.e, they commonly know who they want to exclude or include. 
Care Team Role
Role Hierarchies
In our proposed design, a consumer's consent instructions are expressed by means of allowing and denying hierarchically related roles that employ a range of different classifications and granularity. More generally, the model allows any number of role hierarchies to be used. Hierarchies with different roots can be joined, allowing multi-dimensional structures that support complex (multiple) inheritance. The prototype provides a convenient method of expression to identify entities using two principle role-based hierarchies:
-the clinical competency hierarchy -this hierarchy is used to recognise and identify registered clinicians. The hierarchy includes a special role for each individual registered clinician, e.g. Registered Nurse: Barry Roberts. Individual roles of the user acting as them self are used to implement explicit acceptance or denial of individuals. Note that any node in the hierarchy can be specifically allowed or denied; -the affiliation hierarchy -this hierarchy allows provider organisations to recognise individuals as members of clinical (e.g. Psychologist @ Acme Health Care) and administrative organisational roles.
Explanation of the Model
In simple terms, our proposed model implements an anti-RBAC that represents general consent with explicit denial. This anti-RBAC is unified with standard RBAC which implements general denial with explicit consent via a new authorisation algorithm. This permits a flexible and expressive revised model which retains RBAC's elegance without the need for constraints. Figure 2 shows the modified relationship between roles and permissions. A care team role encapsulates a consent allowed role (from standard RBAC ) and a consent denied role (from anti-RBAC ). The denied role is associated with a negative permission and the allowed role is associated with a positive permission. Care teams are populated, as in the usual way, by inheritance. Each role can inherit from any number of subsidiary roles, (e.g. Dr X inherits from Doctors) and each role or its descendants can be associated with either consent allowed or consent denied.
The example in Figure 2 shows general consent for all Doctors qualified by explicit denial for Dr X. The user Doctor X assumes the role of the user acting as them self 6 -i.e. the role Doctor X, as shown in Figure 2 , and inherits permissions from Care Team #6667 Consent Denied. Under normal RBAC rules, he also inherits the permissions from Care Team #6667 Consent Allowed via the Doctors role, but the new algorithm states that the first permission inherited down the path of a hierarchy is the one that takes precedence or sticks. Therefore, Doctor X is denied. Authorisation Algorithm This section presents the authorisation algorithm for the proposed scheme. Any node in a hierarchy has access rights that are explicitly allowed, explicitly denied or ambiguous. The case for explicit allowance or denial is simple -that node is accorded that access role without relying upon other nodes in the hierarchy.
An ambiguous node inherits permission from its children. If any of its immediate children have explicit denial, then the ambiguity of the node resolves also to denial. If this is not the case, then ambiguous children must first be resolved into either allowance or denial, and any emerging denial also passes to the ambiguous parent. The ambiguity of the parent translates to allowance only if none of the children have denial. Ambiguous nodes in the hierarchy can not be resolved if all of their children (immediate and remote) are also ambiguous. In this case, the model of implicit denial decrees that ambiguous leaves can resolve automatically to denial. This is formalised in the following algorithm, which resolves the access rights of the role labeled start 7 1. Consider role start. Go to step 2.
Does this role have explicit denial?
-if yes, then halt algorithm with access denied -if no, go to step 3.
Does this role have explicit allow?
-if yes, then if this role is start, halt algorithm with access allowed -if yes, but this role is not start • if no more siblings, go to step 5, otherwise • resume at step 2 with next sibling and access allowed -if no, go to step 4. 4. For each child 'x' of this role, -set role to child 'x' -go to step 2. 5. Has an access allowed been received?
-if yes and role is start, halt algorithm with access allowed -if no and role is start, halt algorithm with access denied -otherwise set role to parent's next sibling and resume at step 2 with any received access allowed
An Example of a Nested Allow and Deny Policy Figure 3 illustrates the example that we introduced in Section 2. Doctors are allowed to access the document by virtue of the inheritance of Care Team #6667 Consent Allowed through the clinicians role. Nurses at City Clinic obtain the first permission through the Nurses role, which happens to be the negative permission associated with Care Team #6667 Consent Denied. Nurses at Acme Clinic obtain the positive permission associated with Care Team #6667 Consent Allowed, except for the Mother-in-law Nurse, Alice who directly obtains Care Team #6667 Consent Denied.
Prototype Implementation
We have developed a prototype distributed health information system that implements the proposed access control model to establish the model's viability and practicality. The prototype was successfully tested against a broad set of sample case scenarios to ensure that access policies reflecting realistic and challenging situations could be represented and enforced 8 . 7 In the context of the prototype, the start role is the role of the user acting as them self i.e., the individualised role of the user requesting access. 8 Details of some of the sample case scenarios that were used to validate the model can be accessed at http://www.health.gov.au/hsdd/primcare/it/pdf/testcase.pdf. 
Prototype Architecture
The prototype consists of a directory server, a document server and a client application. The directory server is a logically centralised LDAP 9 directory that is used by the document server to retrieve information about the roles that individuals hold and the details of the role hierarchies. While it is logically centralised, its actual deployment and management can be distributed. This is important because the data contained in the directory needs to be kept up to date by different organisations. In the prototype, the document server is responsible for storing and mediating access to protected health information. Our proposed RBAC access control logic is implemented in the document server. The design supports retrieval of individual documents or all the data that a requester is authorised to see for a particular consumer. All interactions with the document server are authenticated. The client application is used for consent administration, document publishing and document retrieval. Care team roles are created and modified with a simple drag and drop interface that allows clinical and organisational roles to be added to the consent allowed and denied lists. This is illustrated in Figure 4 . The role hierarchies are graphically displayed, with allowed roles in green and implicitly or explicitly denied roles in red.
Documents are published to the document server by associating care team roles with the document elements and approving the transfer. The consent allowed and denied lists display as each individual section of a document is selected. This makes it easy for the consumer and clinician to understand how access will be controlled. Different sections or elements of the same record, message, or document, (the data) may have different levels of sensitivity and therefore, different consent conditions will be applicable. This is supported in our design because these different elements can each reference a separate care team role. This assumes that the underlying data format is structured in a way that permits the unique identification of data elements, as is the case with medical record standards such as HL7 10 . This does not imply that HL7 based systems are a prerequisite for the proposed model. The required structure can be added to information extracted from legacy systems at the time it is retrieved.
Conclusions
Role-based Access Control systems adhere to the principle where anything that is not explicitly allowed is implicitly denied. In health care, it is often more efficient and reliable to use the opposite form of expression, where denied access is explicitly stated. Distributed health information networks require a combination of both forms of expression to allow the system to implement access policy in a way that mirrors the way consumers commonly think about who should have access to their health information. This results in a system that is easier for clinicians and consumers to understand and manage. This paper has indentified that standard RBAC models don't support a policy expression in the form of a general consent with explicit denial with adequate flexibility for distributed health information networks. We have presented an adaptation of RBAC that supports general consent with explicit denial. The proposed model also permits allow and deny policies to successively qualify each other in a role hierarchy supporting inheritance. This results in an access control framework that exhibits great flexibility and efficiency in the range of access policies that it can support. This model has been implemented in a prototype distributed health information system.
